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We formalize the idea that when managers require external investment to expand, higher-skilled firms willbe more likely to diversify in equilibrium, even though managers can exploit asymmetric information
about their ability to raise capital from investors. We exploit the timing of new fund launches in the hedge
fund industry to distinguish between agency and capability effects in firm product diversification decisions,
using a large survivor-bias-free panel data set on the hedge fund industry from 1994 to 2006. Empirically we
show that diversifying firms’ excess returns are high relative to those of other firms prior to diversification and
fall within firm following diversification, but are six basis points higher per month per unit of risk ex post
compared to a matched sample of focused firms. The evidence suggests that managers exploit asymmetric
information about their own ability to time diversification decisions; yet, the discipline of markets ensures that
better firms diversify, on average. The results provide large-sample empirical evidence that agency effects and
firm capabilities jointly influence diversification decisions.
Key words : organizational studies; strategy; financial institutions; investment; economics; econometric dynamics
History : Received January 21, 2010; accepted April 20, 2011, by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy. Published
online in Articles in Advance August 12, 2011.
1. Introduction
Scholars have long advanced the idea that diver-
sification creates value by enabling firms to apply
their unique capabilities across multiple products
(Teece 1980, Panzar and Willig 1981). By contrast,
the diversification discount literature proposes that
managers diversify for private gain even when doing
so destroys firm value (Lang and Stulz 1994, Berger
and Ofek 1995), a perspective that draws heavily on
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Although
capabilities and agency theories make different pre-
dictions about the effect of diversification on firm
performance, they are not mutually exclusive with
respect to the causes of diversification. In this paper,
we integrate the predictions of capabilities and agency
theories into a simple equilibrium model and use
the model to predict a broad pattern of performance
before and after diversification events. We then test
the predictions of the model, using a series of econo-
metric tests that identify capability and agency effects
in the decision to diversify.
The model integrates the predictions of agency
and capabilities theories in a straightforward way.
Firms are more likely to diversify when they possess
unique skills and knowledge in one domain, enabling
them to generate higher future returns in a related
activity (Peteraf 1993, Bernard et al. 2010). How-
ever, agency theory implies that lucky firms are also
likely to try to diversify if they can use idiosyncratic
performance shocks to extract value from investors
(Jensen 1983). We explore the rich interplay among
skill, luck, performance, and diversification to show
conditions under which firms will be more likely
to diversify. The key insight from the model is that
when managers require external capital to expand,
less skillful firms always have weaker incentives to
diversify given a particular track record. The intuition
behind this result is that although managers are able
to increase their own compensation in the short run
by diversifying, the attractiveness of diversification
depends not only on investors’ current beliefs but also
on their expected future beliefs. Because firms reveal
their true type through performance over time, and
do so even faster when they diversify, as in Cabral
(2000), less skillful firms always have weaker incen-
tives to diversify given a particular track record.
We test the predictions of the model in the context
of the $1.7 trillion hedge fund industry (Hedge Fund
Research 2010) using a large and rich panel data set
on 1,353 hedge funds from 1994 to 2006. The hedge
fund industry offers a unique laboratory for studying
capabilities and agency effects. As residual claimants
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of funds, investors are exposed to managers’ incen-
tives to misrepresent their skill ex ante, which man-
agers may take advantage of by raising money to
launch additional funds when the firm experiences a
lucky streak. Thus, the hedge fund context facilitates
a test of ex ante agency costs, or timing effects, asso-
ciated with diversification. Another advantage of the
hedge fund context is that firm performance is readily
measureable at the product (fund) level over rela-
tively long periods of time, which allows us to sepa-
rate persistent skill effects from idiosyncratic shocks.
The pattern evident in the data is striking. Excess
returns are well above the sample mean prior to
diversifying and fall rapidly following the launch of
a second fund. However, after matching diversifiers
to nondiversifiers, based on all the observable differ-
ences ex ante, diversifiers outperform nondiversifiers.
Consistent with the agency cost literature, the results
suggest managers time diversification decisions to
exploit asymmetric information about their own abil-
ity to private advantage; yet, market forces constrain
lower-ability firms’ expansion options. Thus, firms
launching new funds tend to possess greater invest-
ment skill than firms that remain focused and are able
to leverage their investment skill across new funds in
a manner consistent with the capabilities literature.
In the remainder of this paper, we develop our
argument in more detail. In the following section, we
introduce our model of diversification and derive the
above described predictions. In §3, we examine the
hedge fund industry and describe the data. In §4, we
develop our empirical specification and discuss the
results. In §5, we offer conclusions.
2. Skill, Luck, and
the Multiproduct Firm
A number of papers, using agency cost logic, have
shown that there are costs associated with diversifi-
cation: in internal capital markets (Lamont 1997), in
hierarchical management structures (Rajan et al. 2000,
Scharfstein and Stein 2000), and in managements’
span of control (Schoar 2002). However, studies
using Coasin logic (Coase 1937), fine-grained micro-
data (Villalonga 2004), and controls for endogene-
ity (Campa and Kedia 2002) have raised questions
about whether the costs of diversification systemati-
cally exceed the benefits of diversification, or if the
early results are artifacts of the data or methods. This
paper takes a step toward reconciling the ostensive
conflict between agency theory and the Coasian tra-
dition (Coase 1937) reflected in recent empirical work
and in the capabilities literature on diversification. By
shifting the emphasis away from the ex post costs
of diversification toward the ex ante costs, the costs
investors bear when managers time their investments
to take advantage of asymmetric information, which
more closely map to the original basis for agency
theory, this paper shows how the agency cost liter-
ature and the capabilities literature complement one
another.
In the remainder of this section, we develop a
formal model of diversification in the presence of
skill and luck that builds on and extends the capa-
bilities and agency cost literatures in the context of
diversification. We define skill as an inimitable rent-
generating capability (Barney 1986). We also follow
the capabilities literature by focusing on the role of
skill transference across products in the context of
related diversification. For tractability, we tailor the
analysis toward the hedge fund industry, though we
also discuss how the model generalizes to other con-
texts. In our context, skill can be characterized as
investment ability, a conception of skill that is closely
related to forecasting skill in the sense that firms pos-
sess heterogeneous ability with respect to anticipating
future payoffs from current investments (Makadok
and Walker 2000, Pierce 2009). Skills are transferable
across products to the extent that investment ability in
one strategy class is correlated with investment ability
in another strategy class.
Though we do not explicitly measure relatedness in
our empirical work, hedge fund diversification would
appear to satisfy any of the standard measures of
related diversification.1 The relatedness assumption is
important because the capabilities literature has long
argued that firm resources, tangible or intangible,
are more readily transferable across related products
(Wernerfelt and Montgomery 1988, Silverman 1999).
By extending their capabilities into related activities,
high-ability firms can create value by expanding the
scope of the firm. We extend the capabilities literature
by formalizing the idea that higher-skilled firms are
more likely to diversify in the context of an equilib-
rium model that also takes agency costs into account.
In our model, managers are classic agents, as in
Jensen and Meckling (1976), who are purely self-
interested and actively seek the opportunity to use
asymmetric information to exploit investors. While the
model builds on the seminal notion of agency costs
by examining how managers use asymmetric infor-
mation for private gain, our approach differs from
agency theoretic models that assume managers can
exploit internally generated free cash flow to fund the
firm’s expansion (Jensen 1983). Instead, we focus on
1 Relatedness is typically defined using SIC (Standard Industrial
Classification) codes or by evaluating whether the two business
units have similar activities, resources, skills, customer groups, and
physical bases. Our study of new fund launches by hedge funds
meets both definitions of related diversification.
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agency costs that operate through asymmetric infor-
mation managers hold about their own ability when
tapping external capital markets.
Investors are perfectly rational in our model. They
actively seek out managers who are the most likely to
deliver the highest future risk-adjusted returns, while
harboring no illusions about managers’ private incen-
tives and information. Given asymmetric information
between managers and investors about the managers’
true ability level, investors make inferences about
managerial skill based on all available information
about the firm, particularly the information embed-
ded in each of the firm’s funds’ past returns and
their previous decisions whether to diversify. Based
on their posterior beliefs about quality, investors allo-
cate capital to managers, where the capital alloca-
tions are correlated with firm performance. However,
only managers know their true investment ability.
Investors only receive a noisy signal of the managers’
ability based on the firm’s track record, which opens
the door for managers to exploit their asymmetric
information for private gain.
Managers know that investors are rational and
will use all observable information about the firm to
form beliefs about the firm’s managers’ underlying
ability, expecting that investors update their beliefs
in each period. Managers also know investors can
be fooled temporarily by idiosyncratic performance
shocks, but that diversification reveals more informa-
tion about the firm by sending multiple signals to
investors about the firm’s true ability in any given
time period (Cabral 2000). Thus, the manager’s prob-
lem is whether and when to diversify, based on the
firm’s performance track record and their true abil-
ity, whereas the investor’s problem is where to invest.
The solution to the joint optimization problem deliv-
ers several testable predictions about the pattern of
returns around diversification events.
2.1. Model Setup
There are N investment managers, indexed j =
11 0 0 0 1N , and a (representative) investor I . In each
period, the investment managers produce returns
according to
rjt = j + jt1
where rjt is the period’s excess return above the risk-
free asset for investment manager j ; j is a firm’s
capability level or, specifically, the investment skill of
the manager; and jt is a random shock. Furthermore,
we assume for simplicity that jt is independent and
identically distributed with E4jt5= 0 and V 4jt5= 2 ,
which means E4jtkt5 = 0 for j 6= k, and E4jtjs5 = 0
for s 6= t.
Each investment manager has zero cost to operate
their first fund.2 If a manager decides to launch a sec-
ond fund, they pay a cost cj in the period when the
second fund is launched, a decision tracked by an
indicator variable djt, which is 1 if a second fund is
launched in t or 0 otherwise.
If a second fund is launched, we denote each
of the funds with a superscript l and assume that
returns are generated according to r ljt = j +ljt, where
E4ljt1
m
jt 5 > 0 for l 6=m.3 Thus, firm j’s capabilities are
defined by a draw from the underlying distribution
of , and they are manifest in a within-firm correlation
in performance, which we denote j , between funds.
An investment manager’s payoff in period t is
simply
ujt =w1jt +w2jt − djtcj1
where the wkjt is the weight I assigns to manager j’s
fund k in period t. If a second fund does not exist in
a particular period, then w2jt = 0. In other words, the
payoff is increasing linearly in the allocation weight
the investor gives to the investment manager’s funds,
less the cost of the fund. The equation is intended
to be a simple version of a profit function for the
investment manager, where the costs are fixed and
the revenues are proportional to assets under man-
agement (AUM).
Furthermore, the investment manager’s multi-





Each investment manager’s type is characterized by
the pair 8j1 cj9, where
j =
{
1 with probability p1
0 otherwise1
and cj ∼ h4c5, where h4c5 is a continuous distribution
with nonnegative support and associated cumulative
distribution function H4c5. Furthermore, we assume
that that the two types are drawn independently so
that Corr4cj1 j5= 0.4
2 We make the assumption that an existing firm has already sunk
the costs necessary to operate an initial fund for analytic conve-
nience. It has no bearing on the substantive analysis.
3 To make the model tractable, we assume investment skill is con-
stant across funds within a firm. A more general model might allow
investment skill to vary within a firm, based on how closely related
the new fund is to the firm’s existing fund. Although introducing
variation in investment skill would be an interesting extension of
our model, our results will continue to hold as long as investment
skill is positively correlated between funds within a firm.
4 In this setup,  can be thought of as investment skill, because it
measures how effectively a manager generates excess returns for
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The investor has a standard mean–variance util-
ity function. In each period, the investor obtains the
ex ante utility of




where w is a vector of allocation weights,  is a vec-
tor of expectations of excess returns, ìt is the ex ante
variance–covariance of returns the investor faces, and
 is a parameter measuring I ’s risk aversion. As with
the investment manager, the investor obtains a mul-
tiperiod utility, which is the discounted sum of the





In the foregoing, we assume that the investor, in
each period, acts myopically with respect to (1).5
In each period, the investor solves the problem
in (1) and allocates their capital, and the investment
manager chooses, at the beginning of the second
period, whether to launch a new fund. Therefore,
in the three-period model, the sequence is as fol-
lows. In the first period, nature draws a type for
each investment manager j , investor I chooses a vec-
tor of weights w1 to each fund, returns are real-
ized, and period payoffs are obtained. In the second
period, each investment manager chooses whether to
launch a second fund 4dj25, investor I chooses a vec-
tor of weights w2 to each fund, returns are realized,
investors, and cj can be thought of as managerial skill, because it
measures how economically a hedge fund firm can provide its
investment skill to investors. As we will see later, these dual sources
of uncertainty play a crucial role in the asymmetric information
problem between managers and investors.
5 The results of Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969, 1971) show that
this reduced form assumption will hold under various conditions
(with rebalancing) that could easily be specified here with no mate-
rial effect on the analysis. It is important to note that in this case, the
conditions for myopia are potentially complicated by the strategic
aspects of the game for both investors and investment managers.
In particular, because there is potential information revealed after
each round about the investment manager’s type, it may be possi-
ble that fully rational investors would shade down their allocations
to account for the reduced risk introduced by type uncertainty in
every round. Indeed, this intuition that investors shade their allo-
cations in early periods because of greater uncertainty and allocate
more in later periods is correct, but in the game is driven by the
fact that posteriors—including uncertainty about types—after each
round are weakly more precise. That said, there is no additional
effect (i.e., holding back capital for the known higher risk-adjusted
returns later) because the extant results are invariant to changing
opportunity sets (see Campbell and Viceira 2002). If one knows that
future risk-adjusted returns will be higher than present ones, one
would still like to have more capital to deploy in those later peri-
ods, because it will maximize final consumption or wealth. That
causes one to optimally take risk given the current period’s oppor-
tunity set.
and period payoffs are obtained. Finally, in the third
period, investor I chooses a vector of weights w3 to
each fund, returns are realized, and period payoffs are
obtained.6
2.2. Model Results
To solve this game, we use the equilibrium con-
cept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), so equilib-
rium actions must be sequentially rational, and beliefs
of the players must be consistent with Bayes’ rule
on the equilibrium path. We derive three primary
results, which we then evaluate empirically. First,
firms that have enjoyed above average performance
are more likely to diversify. Second, ex post, on aver-
age, firms that diversify perform worse than they did
ex ante. Finally, we show that given a particular pre-
diversification track record, those with greater invest-
ment skill will diversify at a higher rate than those
with less investment skill. Collectively, the results
imply that diversifiers will revert to the mean, but not
as strongly as nondiversifiers with the same prediver-
sification performance.
To derive these results, we start with an analysis of
the behavior of the investor. Consider the investor’s
problem. Let Ìt denote a vector with K elements
indexed by jl, for each fund in the opportunity set, of
expected returns in period t to each fund.
Given these characteristics, in period t, the in-





This setup has a number of features that sub-
stantially simplify characterization of the equilib-
rium of the game. Perhaps most notable is a result
from the standard capital asset pricing model (Sharpe
1964): The weights to managers are independent
because manager returns are drawn independently,
and there is no full-investment constraint. Further-
more, although weights to managers are independent,
weights to different funds, provided by the same
manager, are not independent both because the s
within a period are correlated and the error in esti-
mating a manager’s skill also creates correlated risk
across a manager’s funds for the investor. Said differ-
ently, the ex ante uncertainty in a manager’s returns
is common across all of their funds, because all of the
returns are drawn from the same underlying distribu-
tion, and is the sum of the error in estimating j and
the random error in their return generating process.
We now turn to our results concerning diversifica-
tion. As with many signaling models, in this model
6 Note, we adopt the notation that when we drop the subscript t
from djt, the indicator variable dj simply indicates whether a man-
ager has chosen to diversify.
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there exists a pooling equilibrium in which no one
ever diversifies. This is a straightforward application
of the fact that off path beliefs are unconstrained by
PBE. Thus, investors could believe that any diversi-
fier is a low type, and that on the equilibrium path,
the probability that any manager is a high type is p.
These beliefs will guarantee that diversification never
occurs in equilibrium.
What about equilibria in which some diversification
occurs? As a first step to answering this question, we
establish a result that must hold in any equilibrium in
which diversification occurs. We will then turn to the
task of establishing the existence of a particular form
of equilibrium.
Consider first how such an equilibrium may
behave. In particular, one might think that firms with
identical track records, in the first round, will make
identical decisions about whether or not to launch
a new fund. In fact, this intuition is not correct.
To see this, consider the calculus behind launching
a new fund for a set of managers with a history
4rt1d5, where rt indicates the manager’s returns up
to period t, and d indicates whether a manager has
diversified. A manager will diversify if and only if the
expected payoff from diversification is greater than
the expected payoff from nondiversification:
w124r1105+E4w134r21055≤w124r1115+w224r1115
+E4w134r2115+w234r21155−cj 0 (3)
The left-hand side of (3) is the expected payoff for
staying focused: the sum of the size of the allocation
to the manager’s only fund in the second period and
what the manager can expect to be allocated in the
third period. Importantly, this latter value will be a
function of investors’ beliefs about the manager’s type
at the end of the first period and the expected return
of the manager in the second period. The right-hand
side is a similar expression for the expected payoff for
a manager who chooses to diversify.7
Rearranging terms, we have the result that if diver-
sification is an equilibrium, a firm will diversify if and
only if their costs to launch a new fund are below a
critical level, ccritj 4r15:
cj ≤ ccritj 4r15 = 6w124r1115−w124r11057
+ 6E4w134r21155−E4w134r210557
+ 6w224r1115+ E4w234r2115570 (4)
The inequality in (4) illustrates the trade-off for the
manager. First, to diversify, the manager must pay cj ,
7 Note that incorporated in (3) are any beliefs the investor may have
after first and second period returns, conditional on diversification.
which is captured on the left side of Equation (4). Sec-
ond, because returns are ex ante correlated, the allo-
cation weight investors give to the original fund in
the first period will be unambiguously lower than it
would have been in the absence of the launch of a
second fund. This is captured by the term w124r1115−
w124r1105 in (4), which one might call a cannibaliza-
tion effect: diversification is costly to the firm, on the
margin, in terms of lowering investor allocations to
fund 1. There is also a potential for either a lower or
higher weight to fund 1 in the third period, depend-
ing on the expectation of the weight given r1. Sim-
ply put, mean reversion implies that if r1 is below
the manager’s type, in expectation, the manager’s
returns in future periods will be higher, and if it is
above the manager’s type, in expectation, it will be
lower. Moreover, with the launch of the second fund,
the manager should expect to be closer to the mean
return (their type j5 than in the case where they do
not launch a second fund at every point in time in
the future. Because investors update their beliefs of
a manager’s type based on the additional informa-
tion embedded in the second fund’s returns, diver-
sification creates a track record dilution effect, which
is captured by the term 6E4w134r21155 − E4w134r210557
in (4), as in Cabral (2000). Finally, these (potential)
costs will be compared with an unambiguous benefit.
Because investors are assumed to be unconstrained
in borrowing, investors face no trade-off in allocat-
ing to the second fund. Thus, a second fund produces
incremental revenue for the firm’s managers, and
therefore managers will always be better off when
they diversify, conditional on cannibalization, track
record dilution, and diversification costs. We refer
to the unambiguous benefits of diversification as the
scope extension effect, which is captured by the term
w224r1115+ E4w234r21155.
Even though managers with identical histories will
be treated symmetrically by the investor in period 2,
managers with lower investment skill will have
weaker incentives, for every level of realized returns
in period 1, to launch a second fund because their
expectation of future performance depends on their
type. The fact that second period performance, in
expectation, is lower for low-skilled managers means
they can expect lower allocations in the third period
and, therefore, will be less willing to launch an addi-
tional fund. In other words, in any diversification
equilibrium, c∗H 4r15 ≥ c∗L4r15, where c∗j 4r15 denotes the
equilibrium ccritj 4r15 for a type j . This conclusion is
summarized as follows:
Lemma 1. Conditional on first period returns r1, in any
equilibrium in which there is diversification, the probability
a high type will diversify is higher than the probability a
low type will diversify.
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To pin down our analysis further, we return to the
issue of pooling equilibria. One feature of this model
is that after the first period, there is no dependence
between the equilibria that are played for a given
path r1. This means that if separation occurs in equi-
librium for some r , it could be the case that for an
arbitrary small value  there could be pooling for r1 +
. In fact, this leads to the possibility that measures of
r1 alternate between pooling and separation. Because
each unique “slice” of r1 may pool, there are equilib-
ria in which at lower-level managers may separate,
whereas at intermediate levels they may pool, and at
higher levels they may return to separation. That said,
other equilibria also exist to this game. In fact, as our
intent is simply to provide sufficient conditions for
the dynamic we describe above, we show there are
also equilibria in which low-cost firms diversify and
high-cost firms do not.8
Lemma 2. There exists an equilibrium in which for suf-
ficiently low costs, managers will diversify and otherwise
will stay focused.
We now turn to our primary result. In the appendix,
we construct an equilibrium such that managers with
very low returns in the first period all stay focused,
managers with very high level of returns diversify,
and managers in the “middle” diversify only when
their costs are sufficiently low. Such an equilibrium—
along with the fact that higher-quality managers
in any equilibrium with diversification diversify at
higher rates given their track record—allows us to
establish the existence of an equilibrium to the game
with three testable properties. Result 1 summarizes
the characteristics of this equilibrium.
Result 1. There exists an equilibrium in which the fol-
lowing three properties hold:
(i) Diversifiers will outperform nondiversifiers in the
prediversification period: Ej4r1  dj = 15≥ Ej4r1  dj = 05.
(ii) In expectation, the performance of diversifiers will
fall after diversification: Ej4r1  dj = 15≥ Ej4r12  dj = 15.
(iii) Conditional on first period returns, diversifiers
will outperform nondiversifiers: Ej4r
1
2 + r13  r11dj = 15 ≥
Ej4r
1
2 + r13  r11dj = 05.
At this point, the intuition behind each component
of Result 1 follows straightforwardly from the earlier
results. The first result that nondiversifiers will under-
perform diversifiers, prior to diversification, is driven
8 Although the equilibria is not unique, the equilibrium we study
is a natural one to study. If we confine the analysis to look at the
maximally separating equilibrium, then the cutpoints will be increas-
ing, assuming they exist. The intuition for this result is that both
the maximum cutpoints of both types are increasing in r1. More-
over, as we show in the appendix, these can both hold simultane-
ously, which means maximal separation occurs when cutpoints are
increasing.
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same ex ante returns














by two facts: cost cutoffs are weakly increasing in first
period returns, and the more skillful managers are
more likely to diversify conditional on any r1. The sec-
ond result follows from the same set of facts, namely
that the probability of diversifying is increasing in the
first period return, which in turns means it is increas-
ing in the random shock to a manager’s return. In
expectation, therefore, the postdiversification return
must fall. Finally, the last component—conditional on
first period returns, the returns of diversifiers will
fall less in expectation than nondiversifiers—follows
directly from Lemma 1. Because highly skilled types
will be more likely to diversify conditional on first
period returns, they will have a higher expected
return after diversification than nondiversifiers. This,
in turn, makes investors’ beliefs about the diversi-
fiers rational. Figure 1 illustrates our three predictions
graphically.
Our theory predicts a pattern of returns that is
broadly consistent with a set of stylized facts, reported
in the literatures on diversification and investment
firms. Fund managers’ private incentives influence
their strategic choices (Chevalier and Ellison 1997).
Legacy business unit (fund) returns fall following
diversification (Schoar 2002), particularly when pre-
ceded by unusually strong reported performance
(Teoh et al. 1998); yet, firms with the best track
record tend to launch new funds, and their perfor-
mance tends to persist relative to a control group
(Kaplan and Schoar 2005). Our model explains these
stylized facts in a simple testable equilibrium frame-
work.9 Neither agency effects nor capabilities alone
can explain the full set of results demonstrated.
9 Cabral (2000) develops a related model in which firms extend
their existing brands when both quality and returns of earlier prod-
ucts are jointly sufficiently high. That said, Cabral (2006) provides
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Other theories might explain some of our results,
but cannot generate the full set of results predicted
either. For example, Roll’s (1986) hubris argument
might explain why firms that experience an idiosyn-
cratic performance shock diversify and then suf-
fer declining returns because they develop excessive
pride based on their track record. However, hubris
cannot explain why diversifiers outperform firms
that remain focused. Similarly, while management of
returns around diversification events or anticipation
of falling returns may explain parts (i) and (ii) of
Result 1, they cannot explain part (iii).
The hedge fund industry is somewhat unique, and
so caution should be applied in generalizing the
model to other industrial contexts. Hedge fund firms
diversify by launching new funds, which are invest-
ment products that deliver a stream of cash flows.
Thus, hedge funds require new investment to diver-
sify. Furthermore, hedge fund customers are also
investors. Although hedge fund diversification is sim-
ilar to product diversification in industrial companies,
in the sense that the performance of each new prod-
uct impacts the firm’s overall reputation (Wernerfelt
1988, Cabral 2000), industrial customers are not typ-
ically investors, and industrial investors cannot usu-
ally choose which of the firm’s products to invest
in. To the extent that product performance is not as
volatile in industrial markets, agency costs associated
with market timing around peak performance may be
less important. On the other hand, agency costs will
tend to be more severe when managers have access to
free cash flow and do not have to tap external capital
markets to fund their diversification strategies (Jensen
1983). Nevertheless, the model proposed is general,
and the hedge fund industry is interesting to study as
we discuss below.
3. Data and Institutional Context
Hedge funds are closed to the general public and
are not required to publicly report their returns.
However, a large number of funds do choose to
a modification of his model to apply specifically to unrelated diver-
sification and shows that, in this context, lower-skilled managers
may have greater incentives to diversify given that their “anchor”
product is not that valuable. MacDonald and Slivinski (1987) pro-
vide a general equilibrium model in which some firms diversify
and others do not, much like our model. Berk and Green (2004)
provide a model similar to ours, in which firms have heterogeneous
abilities to generate returns, and investors invest rationally; how-
ever, in equilibrium, investment managers’ decisions result in little
persistence in outperformance. Our model also has some similari-
ties to Bar-Isaac (2003), who develops a model in which reputations
of sellers are learned slowly. He analyzes an equilibrium in which
good sellers who know their quality may continue to sell in the
face of a bad reputation to have more “draws” to reveal their true
type, but bad types may stop selling in the face of a bad reputation.
report their returns to one or more private compa-
nies that make their data available by subscription.
Our data on hedge funds, from Lipper-TASS (TASS)
and Hedge Fund Research (HFR), were provided to
us for research purposes by a major financial institu-
tion. The data series begins in 1977, but only includes
“graveyard” funds, funds that stopped reporting to
the data providers for any reason, including fund fail-
ure, from 1994. We use the survivor-bias-free sub-
sample of the data 1994–2006 as our main sample,
though our results are robust to using the full sam-
ple as well. Taking TASS and HFR data together, we
have coverage on 3,102 firms over the period 1994–
2006, representing approximately 25% of the firms in
the industry.
Consistent with the standard definition of diver-
sified firms as multiproduct firms and with the
literature on mutual fund product diversification
(Siggelkow 2003), we consider hedge fund firms to be
diversified when they operate multiple funds. With
the exception of onshore/offshore and currency twin
funds, which we consider a single fund in our sample,
hedge funds generally launch new funds with dis-
tinct investment objectives and/or trading strategies
compared to their existing funds. Thus, diversification
is usually distinct from expansion in the context of
hedge funds.
Among all the data sets used in the hedge fund lit-
erature, TASS and HFR are considered the most com-
prehensive (Li et al. 2011). Whereas most researchers
rely on either one or the other, we believe this is
the first paper to integrate these two data sets, mak-
ing our data set the largest survivor-bias-free data set
assembled to date on hedge funds. However, the data
do have some important limitations. Firms choose
whether to report their data to HFR and TASS, pre-
sumably out of self-interest; therefore, the data may
be subject to selection bias. Although we do not know
what decision making processes lead firms to self-
report their data, based on our discussions with hedge
fund managers, we believe hedge funds are more
likely to self-report to TASS and HFR when they are
interested in raising capital at some future date for
expansion of their existing fund and/or for expan-
sion through product diversification. Thus, although
our results may not generalize to hedge funds that
do not require external capital to expand, this lim-
itation does not represent a major problem for our
research because we are explicitly interested in study-
ing firms that require external capital to expand.10
10 Annual returns reported to investors are audited, which limits
the scope for misrepresentation for most firms. However, firms
might manipulate monthly returns within a year for strategic rea-
sons. We rely on our empirical design to deal with these effects.
Fortunately, the most obvious self-reporting bias is not a problem
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Because small variations in spelling and abbrevia-
tions, integrating the two data sets also requires some
manual comparisons across data sets. We had two
research assistants perform the manual comparisons
independently, and then resolved the few discrepan-
cies through inspection.
To make the analysis tractable, we examine the per-
formance of a firm’s first fund before and after the
firm’s first horizontal expansion (i.e., the launch of a
second fund). Our analysis, therefore, focuses on 1,876
firms that entered the data set as focused firms, 1,186
firms that remained focused, and 690 firms that sub-
sequently diversified,11 excluding firms that entered
as diversified firms, which we define as becoming a
diversified firm within the first 12 months of enter-
ing the data set, and funds that reported less than
12 months of returns or did not report returns con-
tinuously. After matching diversified firms to firms
that remained focused (described in detail below), our
test sample consists of 37,657 fund-months from 1,353
firms, of which 676 are diversified firms and 677 (one
tie) are a matched set of focused firms.
We test the predictions of the model using risk-
adjusted excess returns as our baseline measure of
firm performance. Empirically, the appropriate mea-
sure of performance depends crucially on the risks
against which performance is evaluated. The recent
financial crisis has raised questions about how well
hedge fund risks are understood. We therefore use
a range of measures intended to control for system-
atic and nonsystematic risk exposure and show that
our results are robust to a wide range of plausible
measures of performance. Because there is general
agreement in the literature that investors price finan-
cial assets controlling for systematic risk exposure,
we assume hedge fund investors benchmark perfor-
mance against broad market indices as a first approx-
imation of fund performance. Thus, we use standard
asset pricing models to estimate excess returns in
our baseline specification. However, hedge funds may
also be exposed to nonsystematic risks that are not
priced by standard market benchmarks. If funds take
on significant nonsystematic risks, perhaps through
for our tests on firm skill, because strategic manipulation in antic-
ipation of diversification would bias the results against our third
prediction (e.g., returns would fall more after diversification than
without manipulation). We address the possibility that diversified
firms inflate their ex post returns using multiple years of lagged
excess returns as our ex ante performance measure, which firms
could only manipulate through more aggressive multiyear fraudu-
lent behavior and by verifying that the results are robust to elimi-
nating firms in the right tail of the returns distribution.
11 For legal reasons, many firms offer identical funds as onshore
(U.S. domiciled) and offshore (non-U.S. domiciled) products. We
treat these onshore/offshore funds as a single fund. We also treat
funds that have identical trading strategies in different currencies
as a single fund.
aggressive use of leverage, they may appear to gen-
erate higher average excess returns that are really
an artifact of model mispricing. We account for the
nonsystematic riskiness of a fund’s underlying invest-
ments using a dynamic version of the information
ratio. We also control for biases that may arise because
of self-reporting, including serial correlation in the
time series of returns using an autoregressive lag one
correction, and for backfill bias by dropping the first
reported monthly return.12
Our baseline performance benchmark follows the
emerging standard for assessing hedge fund perfor-
mance (Sadka 2010). The performance measure is
developed based on Fung and Hsieh’s (2001) seven-
factor asset pricing model, which is specifically
designed for pricing risk in hedge funds by control-
ling for exposures to linear and nonlinear equity, bond,
commodity, and option-based risk factors. We aug-
ment Fung and Hsieh’s (2001) model by including a
“traded liquidity factor” from Pástor and Stambaugh
(2003), which controls for a fund’s exposure to illiquid-
ity risk. Excess returns are the sum of a time-invariant
fund-specific term a plus a mean zero residual e from
the regression
Rit = ai +Rft + XtBi + eit1 (5)
where i and t index funds and time (in months),
respectively; Ri is a fund’s raw return from TASS and
HFR, and the vector X contains the seven risk fac-
tors from Hseih’s data library and the traded liquid-
ity factor from Stambaugh’s website.13 The term ai
is the time-invariant component of a fund’s perfor-
mance, and e is the residual. We compute a, the
coefficients on X, and e by running 1,876 fund-level
longitudinal regressions. Excess returns Y for firm i
in any period t are defined as Yit = ai + eit , where
excess return captures the combination of a fund’s
skill and luck relative to a market benchmark. We call
the resulting measure “eight-factor excess returns.”
We then compute the (dynamic) information ratio as
excess returns (Yit5 divided by the standard devia-
tion of excess returns. Both the information ratio and
excess returns are Winsorized at the 1% and 99% lev-
els to control for extreme values, though doing so
has no meaningful impact on our results. We also
12 Posthuma and van der Sluis (2003) drop the first 36 months of
returns to control for backfill bias. We drop the first month of
recorded return data, because we found that only the first reported
monthly return was significantly different from long-run average
returns. Dropping additional months has little effect on our point
estimates but does lead to noisier estimates because most firms in
the sample diversify within the first 36 months of their existence.
13 The Pástor-Stambaugh series is available at http://finance
.wharton.upenn.edu/~stambaug/liq_data_1962_2008.txt (accessed
July 5, 2009). Hseih’s data library can be found at http://faculty
.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFData.htm (accessed August 4, 2009).
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Table 1 Key Descriptive Statistics for the Main (Matched) Sample
Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Raw returns (%) 0087 5019 −70 116
Eight-factor monthly excess returns (%) 0037 3077 −11018 13035
Standard deviation of excess returns (%) 3057 2078 0039 13089
Eight-factor information ratio 0017 1000 −2048 3001
Diversified (fraction) 0053 n/a 0 1
Fund assets under management ($M) 100 238 002 1,890
Firm assets under management ($M) 147 372 009 8,310
Missing AUM (fraction) 0011 n/a 0 1
Age (months) 47 34 2 345
Year: 1994 0001 n/a 0 1
Year: 1995 0003 n/a 0 1
Year: 1996 0006 n/a 0 1
Year: 1997 0008 n/a 0 1
Year: 1998 0008 n/a 0 1
Year: 1999 0009 n/a 0 1
Year: 2000 0009 n/a 0 1
Year: 2001 0008 n/a 0 1
Year: 2002 0008 n/a 0 1
Year: 2003 0009 n/a 0 1
Year: 2004 0010 n/a 0 1
Year: 2005 0012 n/a 0 1
Year: 2006 0009 n/a 0 1
Headquarters in the United States 0067 n/a 0 1
Notes. The main (matched) sample includes the fund-months from the diversification date (or match date) until
35 months after diversification (or match date) for 676 diversifiers and 677 matched focused firms (there is one
tie). N = 371657 fund-months from 1,353 firms.
replicated all of our results using Fung and Hsieh’s
(2001) seven-factor asset pricing model without the
Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor,
as well as using a more traditional passive benchmark
commonly employed for evaluating mutual funds, the
Fama and French (1996) three-factor model plus a
momentum factor (Carhart 1997).14
We use excess returns as a dependent variable in
our regressions of performance on diversification. We
also use excess returns to compute the average cumu-
lative abnormal returns (CAR), where CAR = èYin/n1
the sum of n lagged excess returns divided by the
number of months the firm was in operation at time t,
a standard measure of a fund’s cumulative historical
performance, in a probit model predicting the launch
of a new fund. We use the average two-year CAR as
our key performance variable predicting the launch of
a new fund. We verify that we obtain similar results
with longer lagged CAR measures and measures of
CAR that give more recent observations more weight
than older observations.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the main
sample, including our excess return and information
ratio measures. On average, the funds in our base-
line sample generated 37 basis points of risk-adjusted
(excess) returns per month with a standard deviation
14 Results using four-factor and seven-factor excess returns (and
the corresponding information ratios) are reported as robustness
checks in Table 4.
of about 4% per month. Adjusting for nonsystematic
risk exposure, using the information ratio, the aver-
age fund generated 17 basis points of excess returns
per unit of risk with a standard deviation of about 1%
per month.
Table 1 also shows descriptive statistics for the con-
trol variables drawn from TASS and HFR, including
size, measured by assets under management, invest-
ment strategy, time, and regional location. The aver-
age fund had $100 million of AUM, whereas the
average firm held $147 million of AUM. The size
distribution of AUM is skewed right, with the top
1% of funds growing to $1.9 billion.15 We take the
nonnormality of AUM into account by using AUM
size deciles from the overall distribution of all TASS
and HFR funds and firms. Our results are unchanged
when we use the log of AUM instead of using size
deciles. Eleven percent of fund-months had missing
AUM, which we control for using a missing AUM
dummy variable.16
15 AUM values are reported Winsorized at the 1st and 99th per-
centiles, though Winsorizing has no effect on the results.
16 Twenty-three percent of returns come from long/short funds—a
general type of fund that often has no meaningful restrictions on
investment strategy. Nineteen percent of funds reported that they
were fund of funds that invest in other hedge funds. The other
58% of funds were distributed over 32 additional investment strat-
egy categories, with the largest being equity hedge (9%), managed
futures (9%), and event driven (7%) strategies. No other strategy
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We report the composition of the sample by calen-
dar year in Table 1, but we use periodicity in three
ways in our analysis: (i) 13 year fixed effects con-
trol for hedge-fund-specific calendar time effects; (ii)
market returns for 132 calendar months control for
time-series variation in market returns in our compu-
tation of excess returns; and (iii) 36 event time cate-
gorical variables control for the time path of returns
after the launch of a new fund (or match date) in our
matched tests.
The hedge fund industry is a global industry,
though approximately two-thirds of the fund-months
in our sample are based in the United States. To the
extent that regional differences influence diversifica-
tion decisions, we also control for the location of the
firm’s headquarters where appropriate.
4. Empirical Specification and Results
4.1. The Propensity to Diversify
Our first prediction is that diversifiers will outper-
form nondiversifiers in the prediversification period.
To generate evidence in support of Result 1(i), we test
whether firms tend to launch new funds when they
experience unusually strong performance. We drop
diversifying firms17 from the analysis following the
month in which they launch a new fund (although
all fund-months are included for firms that remain
focused) and use the probit model
LAUNCH∗it = xitÂ+ it1 (6)
where the unit of observation is the fund-month for
fund i in month t. We estimate the latent variable
LAUNCH∗ using LAUNCH= 1 [LAUNCH∗ > 0] when
the firm launches a new fund. The vector x includes
all observable characteristics of firms that might plau-
sibly have an effect on the decision to launch a new
fund, including CAR; average CAR for other firms
in the same strategy class; 10 fund size declines,
where size is measured by AUM; size of the strat-
egy class; log firm age; 13 time (year) dummies;
10 fund investment strategy dummies; four regional
geographic location dummies; and  as an error term,
which is assumed to be normally distributed with
mean zero and variance one. Standard errors are clus-
tered by firm.
We show the result of estimates of the probit model
(6), using 1,876 firms and 85,428 fund-months, in
category had more than 5% of fund-months. Fund of funds take
positions in other hedge funds. Because fund of funds are some-
what different from traditional hedge funds, we verified that they
are not driving the results in this paper.
17 Because our tests are performed at the level of the fund for a
firm’s first fund only, we use “fund” and “firm” interchangeably
in this section.
Table 2, columns (1) and (2). Column (1) shows that
the marginal effect of CAR on the propensity to diver-
sify without controls is 0.079%, compared to a base-
line diversification rate of 0.801% (690 new fund
launches in 85,428 fund-months), and is strongly sta-
tistically significant. In other words, doubling CAR
from the mean increases the probability that the firm
will launch a new fund in any given month by
approximately 10%. Column (2) shows the marginal
effect of CAR on the propensity to diversify with con-
trols. The result continues to be statistically significant
though the point estimate on CAR is smaller. Hold-
ing all other regressors at their mean values and dou-
bling CAR increases the probability of diversifying by
0.055%, which represents a 7% increase in the baseline
diversification rate. The evidence suggests that strong
performance does indeed increase the probability that
a hedge fund firm will launch a new fund.
We also use the empirical model displayed in
Table 2, column (2), as our baseline matching
model. The baseline matching model uses all of the
information embedded in returns and other observ-
able characteristics of firms and funds to identify a
valid control group of focused firms against which to
measure performance after diversification. Our objec-
tive is to find a matched set of focused firms that
are similar to the set of diversifying firms along all
observable dimensions just prior to diversification so
that we can separate skill from luck effects ex post.
We find and exploit a valid control group, using
standard propensity score matching techniques. First,
following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we calcu-
late the propensity score of the probability of a fund
choosing to launch a new fund in any particular
month, using the probit model (6). Next, we trim the
sample at the 1st and 99th percentiles of the propen-
sity score distribution and eliminate firms off the com-
mon support of the propensity score distributions of
the probability of launching a new fund. Finally, we
match diversifiers to controls, using nearest neighbor
matching without replacement, to create a balanced
sample of 676 treated (diversified) and 677 control
fund-month observations (there is one tie). The inter-
pretation of the control group is that for each fund
that did diversify in a particular month, we identified
the fund that was most similar in terms of all observ-
able characteristics that did not diversify.
In Table 2, columns showing differences in means
give measures of the effectiveness of the matching
process. The unmatched sample columns show the
mean values for CAR for focused and diversifying
firms, respectively, before matching, and test whether
CAR and the means on the control variables are sta-
tistically different between focused and diversifying
firms. Before matching, the differences in CAR, firm
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Table 2 Predicting Diversification and Matching Statistics
Comparison of means in matched and unmatched samples
Predicting
diversification Unmatched samplea Baseline matchb Alternative matchc
Means Means Means(1) (2)
Marginal Marginal Diff. Diff. Diff.
effects % effects % Focused Diversified in meansd Focused Diversified in meansd Focused Diversified in meansd
Avg. eight-factor CAR 0 0079∗ 0 0055∗ 0 053 0 077 −4 013∗ 0 058 0 073 −1086+ 0 071 0 074 −0 032
40 0019 5 40 0017 5 40 0015 40 006 5 40 006 5 40 006 5 40 006 5 40 005 5
Avg. strategy −00033 0050 0048 1047 0046 0048 −0063 0047 0048 −0054
eight-factor CAR 4000845 400005 400025 400025 400025 400025 400025
Size controlse N Y∗ Y Y ∗ Y Y Y Y
Age controlf N Y∗ Y Y ∗ Y Y ∗ Y Y ∗
Strategy fixed effectsg N Y∗ Y Y ∗ Y Y Y Y
Strategy size controlh N Y Y Y ∗ Y Y ∗ Y Y ∗
Year fixed effectsi N Y+ Y Y ∗ Y Y ∗ Y Y
Region fixed effectsj N Y Y Y + Y Y Y Y
Interactionsk N N N N N N Y Y
Unique funds 1,876 1,876 1,186 690 677 676 649 647
N 85,428 85,428 84,738 690 677 676 649 647
F -test on the joint >99∗ 1023 1012
difference in means
Notes. The dependent variable equals 1 if a firm launches a second fund at time (month) t , and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. Y, yes; N, no.
aThe unmatched sample is the full survivor-bias-free sample of first funds from firms in TASS and HFR, 1994–2006.
bThe baseline match sample is derived from 1:1 nearest neighbor matching on the propensity to diversity using model (2) (there is one tie).
cThe alternative match sample modifies model (2) by including interaction effects on CAR with year and size (there are two ties).
dT -tests are reported on individual differences in means; F -tests are reported on tests of the joint differences in means.
eSize controls include own-fund size decile dummies (by AUM) and a dummy for missing size (except in the alternative match where size enters continuously).
fLog age, where age is measured as months from founding date.
gStrategy fixed effects include dummy variables for the 10 largest self-identified investment strategy types (by number of funds).
hLog AUM for all firms in a strategy.
iYear fixed effects include dummy variables for each year, 1994–2006.
jRegion fixed effects include dummies for firms domiciled in the United States, United Kingdom, continental Europe, Asia, and all other locations.
k Interactions include average eight-factor CAR interacted with log AUM, (log AUM )2, missing AUM, and the year fixed effects.
∗Significant at the 5% level; +significant at the 10% level.
size, age strategy class, strategy size, year, and region
between focused and diversifying firms are statisti-
cally significant, and the overall F -test on the joint sig-
nificance of the differences in means very large, which
suggests that the two populations are not statistically
comparable.
The baseline match columns repeat this procedure
for the matched sample. The statistical differences in
size, strategy, and region are completely eliminated,
whereas the difference in CAR is on the margin of sta-
tistical significance. The differences in age and year



































are reduced, and the joint significance of the differ-
ences in the means is eliminated (F = 1023). Compar-
ing the differences in the means in the full sample
with those in the matched sample reveals that match-
ing substantially aligns the ex ante characteristics of
the firms in the diversified and focused groups. Fig-
ure 2 shows this effect graphically. Figure 2(a) shows
the kernel density plots of the distribution of the
propensity scores for diversified and matched focused
firms. Whereas the distributions were quite different
before matching, they are essentially identical after
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Notes. This figure shows average raw returns (vertical axis) for the first fund
from all diversified hedge funds in our sample versus event time on the
horizontal axis. Event time is measured in months around the event (e.g.,
diversification) at time 0. The chart shows the time path of returns from
36 months before diversification to 35 months after diversification for 33,421
fund-months from 676 diversifying firms.
matching; indeed the distributions lie almost directly
on top of one another (Figure 2(b)).18
4.2. Within-Firm Changes
Our second key prediction, Result 1(ii), is that the per-
formance of diversifiers will fall after diversification,
a result that is evident even in a simple time-series
plot of excess returns. Figure 3 shows the relationship
between fund performance and diversification graph-
ically, plotting first fund average excess returns for the
676 diversifying firms in our test sample. As Figure 3
shows, firms tend to diversify when excess returns
are very high, and excess returns fall precipitously
almost immediately following diversification. We esti-
mate within-firm changes in performance more pre-
cisely using
Yit = +i +DIVERSIFIEDit + Tt + XitÂc + it1 (7)
where i and t index funds and time (in months),
respectively, for all first funds in firms that eventually
diversify for five years before and after the diversifica-
tion event; Y represents firm performance measured
by excess returns and the information ratio;  is a
18 To be sure that our ex post results are not being driven by
ex ante differences in CAR, and that time-varying CAR thresholds
are not driving our results, we use an alternative matching model
where CAR is interacted with covariates that, in theory, might have
a marginal effect on the relationship between performance and
diversification, including firm size and calendar year. In Table 2,
the alternative match columns show that the alternative matching
regime eliminates the statistical differences between CAR and the
calendar year fixed effects and slightly improves the F -test on the
joint significance of the means. Our results are robust to this alter-
native matching regime.
fund fixed effect; DIVERSIFIED is a dummy variable
that is equal to 1 when a fund is part of a diversi-
fied firm and 0 otherwise; T is a vector of 13 calendar
year dummies; Xc is a vector of controls including the
log of firm age, the log of AUM by market segment
(“strategy”) and then fund size dummies measured
by deciles of AUM, plus a dummy for missing AUM;
and  is the residual. Standard errors are clustered
by fund.
Table 3, columns (1) and (2), show the results of
the within-fund estimator (7). Excess returns are 14
basis points per month lower following diversifica-
tion. The effect is only significant at the 10% level,
but the p-value is 0.054. Using the information ratio,
performance is four basis points per month per unit
of risk lower following diversification, and the point
estimate is reliably different from zero. Altering the
time window around the diversification month had
no meaningful effect on the results.
Performance falls in hedge funds following diver-
sification. However, we know from the prior litera-
ture that the relationship between diversification and
performance should always be evaluated conditional
on the selection process firms undergo when choos-
ing to launch a new business unit or fund (Campa
and Kedia 2002, Villalonga 2004). Table 3 and Figure 3
both show that returns are higher prior to the launch
of a new fund, which might suggest that better per-
formance causes hedge funds to launch new funds. If
true, then we would expect returns to naturally revert
toward the mean following diversification. To under-
stand if hedge fund returns fall following diversifi-
cation because diversification causes returns to fall,
perhaps due to managerial distraction as in Schoar
(2002), or whether skilled firms diversify when they
are lucky as our model predicts, we use the matched
sample of focused firms identified by our matching
model.
4.3. Matched Sample Ex Post Performance
We compare ex post performance for diversifiers rel-
ative to firms that remain focused beginning from
the diversification or match date for the 1,353 unique
funds identified in our propensity score matching
algorithm. We call the period in which these funds
launched a second fund or were matched “the event,”
and refer to the periods around the event in terms
of event time. To construct our matched test sample,
we examine the event (at time 0) and the 35 months
after the event (01112131 0 0 0 135). Altering the num-
ber of months in the regression following the event
has no meaningful effect on the results. We estimate
the difference in ex post returns between diversifying
firms and the matched set of focused firms using the
pooled ordinary least squares model (8):
Yit = +DIVERSIFIEDit + Tt + XitÂc + it1 (8)
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Table 3 Diversification and Performance
Within-fund changes in performance Matched sample performance
Dependent Eight-factor Eight-factor Eight-factor Eight-factor
variable excess returns information ratio excess returns information ratio
Event window −36 to +35 −36 to +35 0 to +35 0 to +35
(in months)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DIVERSIFIED −0 0136+ −0 0037 ∗ 0 0177 ∗ 0 0061∗
40 00715 40 0018 5 40 0050 5 40 0019 5
Log age −00102+ −00044∗ −00097∗ −00065∗
4000565 4000165 4000395 4000165
Log AUM 00068 00001 −00113∗ −00023
by strategy 4001225 4000295 4000475 4000285
Constant Y Y Y Y
11 size fixed effects Y Y Y Y
13 year fixed effects Y Y Y Y
36 event time fixed effects N N Y Y
5 region fixed effects N N Y Y
11 strategy fixed effects N N Y Y
676 fund fixed effects Y Y N N
Firms 676 676 1,353 1,353
N 33,421 33,421 37,657 37,657
Adjusted R2 0004 0007 0001 0002
Notes. The “within-fund changes in performance” sample includes the fund-months from 36 months before diver-
sification until 35 months after diversification for 676 diversifiers. The matched sample includes the fund-months
from the diversification date (or match date) until 36 months after diversification (or match date) for 676 diversifiers
and 677 matched focused firms (there is one tie). Standard errors are clustered by fund.
∗Significant at the 5% level; +significant at the 10% level.
where i indexes firms, and t indexes calendar time;
performance (Y 5, DIVERSIFIED, and T are as above
in (7); and X includes log firm age, log of assets under
management by strategy, and fund size dummies as
in (7). We also include in X 5 region dummies that
control for location-specific effects, and 11 strategy-
type dummies to control for strategy-specific return
patterns, as well as a vector of event time (month)
dummies for the 36 months after launching a new
fund (or match date for the control group) to control
for the pattern of mean reversion following the event
as predicted by our theoretical model; and  is the
residual. Standard errors are clustered by fund.
Table 3 shows the matched sample eight-factor
ex post returns in columns (3) and (4). Following
diversification, excess returns are 18 basis points per
month higher, and the information ratio is 6 basis
points per month higher, per unit of risk in the first
funds of diversified firms compared to a matched
sample of nondiversifiers, and the coefficients are reli-
ably different from zero. The interpretation supports
our contention that diversifying firms outperform
firms that remain focused ex post, conditional on
being similar across observable dimensions ex ante.
We verify that our results are not sensitive to
including a longer data series of lagged returns to
compute CAR and/or by weighting recent returns
more than older returns in event time (see Table 4
for the results after matching on 60-month weighted
CAR). We also found similar results using an alterna-
tive matching model, which forces ex ante returns to
be more similar between diversifiers and nondiversi-
fiers and controls for the precise pattern of ex ante
returns by calendar time (see Table 4 for the results
using the alternative matching model). Similar results
were obtained when matching only on CAR. Fur-
thermore, we found similar results using firm-level
performance as the dependent variable in (8), which
implies that firms are not using their second fund
to cross-subsidize the first (see Table 4 for firm-level
results).
The overall pattern of evidence is consistent with a
theory of diversification that takes both agency costs
and capabilities seriously. Managers time their diver-
sification events around idiosyncratic performance
shocks, but, on average, better firms diversify. Nei-
ther agency costs nor capabilities alone can explain
the full set of results observed, but together these the-
ories explain the rich pattern of evidence observed
in this study and in the literature more broadly. The
results herein exploit revealed skill ex post to show
how agency effects and capabilities influence strat-
egy decisions ex ante. Thus, the key causal inference
is that skill and luck cause a firm to diversify in a
predictable manner, with skill effects dominating luck
effects.
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Table 4 Robustness Checks
Dependent variables
Regression description n Excess returns Information ratio
Alternative performance measures
Four-factor performance 371657 00144∗ 00054∗
4000495 4000185
Seven-factor performance 371657 00177∗ 00059∗
4000495 4000185
Firm-level performance
Equal weighted eight-factor 371657 00184∗ 00065∗
firm performance 4000495 4000185
Value weighted eight-factor 371657 00183∗ 00065∗
firm performance 4000515 4000195
Alternative matching regimes
Weighted 60-month CAR 371501 00123∗ 00052∗
eight-factor performance 4000535 4000185
Alternative matching regime 351784 00102∗ 00064∗
eight-factor performance 4000485 4000175
Notes. Standard errors clustered by fund in the alternative performance mea-
sures and alternative matching regime robustness checks, and by firm in the
firm-level performance regressions. Coefficient values for DIVERSIFIED are
reported. All regressions contain the same controls as in Table 3. Firm-level
controls are aggregated to the firm level. The “first stage” of the alterna-
tive matching regime model includes CAR interacted with the full set of year
dummies, size (log AUM ), missing AUM, and size 2 (as shown in Table 2).
∗Significant at the 5% level.
5. Conclusion
This paper integrates agency and capabilities theories
into a simple equilibrium framework that yields rich
predictions about the pattern of returns before and
after diversification. We test these propositions in the
context of the global hedge fund industry from 1994
to 2006. The evidence supports agency theory’s pre-
diction that diversification decisions are influenced by
managers’ private information and the predictions of
the capabilities literature that horizontal firm growth
is enabled by unique firm capabilities that can be
leveraged across products within the firm. Our key
findings are that when firms need external capital to
expand, they will tend to diversify when they experi-
ence a positive idiosyncratic performance shock that
raises their performance above that of their peers and
above their long-run average, but better firms diver-
sify in equilibrium, even though managers appear to
exploit asymmetric information about their true abil-
ity to time the market. Thus, at least in the context of
hedge funds, market discipline constrains lucky but
lower-skilled firms’ horizontal expansion choices.
This paper sheds light on two of the most impor-
tant explanations for why firms diversify: agency costs
and capabilities. We provide an equilibrium explana-
tion for how agency costs influence the firm’s decision
to diversify even when diversification creates value on
average, and present evidence consistent with these
effects. Moreover, we address one of the major criti-
cisms of the capabilities literature, that it is tautolog-
ical and inherently untestable (Williamson 1999), by
providing large sample, well-identified evidence that
capabilities influence diversification choices in a pre-
dictable manner. Finally, we show how agency and
capabilities theories are complementary perspectives
in the context of diversification and offer a road map
for identifying the impact of both on diversification
decisions.
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Appendix. Proofs of Results
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume an arbitrary posterior esti-
mate, conditional on play of the game to that point, that
the investor holds about managers with a particular history.




Rearranging, we have the condition that
cj4r15 ≤ w124r1115+w224r1115+ E4w134r21155
+w234r2115−w124r1105− E4w134r210550
Because E4w134r21155 − E4w134r21055 is lower for a low
type than a high type, it must be the case that cH 4r15≥ cL4r15.
Because cj ∼ h4c5 is the same for low and high types and is
atomless, and Corr4cj1 j5= 0, this implies that
Pr4dj = 1  H1 r15 = Pr4cj > cH 4r155
≥ Pr4dj = 1  L1 r15= Pr4cj > cL4r1550 (9)
The remainder of the result follows trivially from (9). 
Proof of Lemma 2. Note that (3) and Lemma 1 are a
result of the manager’s decision problem, and therefore are
met in any nonpooling equilibrium. Note further that from
(3) it is clear that if a manager with cost cj ∼ h4c5 chooses to
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diversify, then all managers k 6= j of the same skill type ,
initial performance r1, and cj < ck also diversify. Because the
distribution of c is atomless, we can then define the decision
for all managers as defined by the thresholds in c at which
diversification occurs.
To specify an equilibrium, we have to define beliefs of the
investor 4d1 r15 = Pr4k = H  d1 r15. For convenience, we
suppress parameters and refer to beliefs using the following
simplified notation where the meaning is clear: 4d1 r15 =
, 411 r15 = 1, and 401 r15 = 0. Because the payoffs in
(3) do not depend on r1, but rather on investor beliefs ,
we can define the best response functions of the managers
given arbitrary beliefs of the investor as c41105. Given
those beliefs and H4c5, the share of types  that diversify is
H4c411055.
Next, note from Lemma 1 that if 1 = 0, then
cH 41105≥ cL41105, and strictly so if cH 41105 > 0. This
implies
E4w124r1115+w224r1115  H 5−E4w124r1115+w224r1115  L5
> E4w124r1105  H 5−E4w124r1105  L50
In any separating equilibrium, beliefs of the investor in








41 −H4cH 4110555q4r5+ 41 −H4cL411055541 − q4r55
1
where q4r5 = Prob4H  r151 or the share of managers with
return history r who are high types.
The above beliefs form a mapping over beliefs of the
investor that are consistent with the best responses of man-
agers. All interior equilibria are fixed points of this map-
ping. However, to show the existence of a diversification
equilibrium, we define the following modified mapping:
If cH 41105≥ cL41105, then
1 =
H4cH 411055q4r5




41 −H4cH 4110555q4r5+ 41 −H4cL411055541 − q4r55
0
Otherwise,
1 = q4r5 and 0 = q4r50
This is clearly a continuous mapping. To show the existence
of diversification we need to show that that same mapping
is defined over the set 601172, where 1 ≥ 0 (i.e., a con-
vex and closed, compact set). If 1 ≥ 0 and cH 41105 ≥
cL41105, it maps to another pair where 1 ≥0. If 1 ≥
0 and cH 41105 < cL41105 it maps to 1 = 00 By
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem we have a fixed point in the
set 601172, where 1 ≥ 0. By Lemma 1, 1 = 0 is not an
equilibrium, so it is not a fixed point, so it must be that
1 ≥0. So this must also be a fixed point of the unmodified
problem above.
It is also a partial pooling equilibrium such that some,
but not all, of both high and low managers diversify for
all r1; namely, note that 1 = 1 is not an equilibrium, because
then there would be no updating, so the expected utili-
ties from diversifying for high types and low types are the
same, but those from not diversifying are weakly higher for
high types, so we would have cH 41105 < cL41105. This
implies that 1 < 1, so some low-type managers diversify.
Because cH 41105≥ cL41105, then some high-type man-
agers also diversify. 
Lemma 3. Define c¯ such that a high-type manager with cost
type c¯ is indifferent between diversifying and staying focused if
the investor has beliefs 14r¯5 = q4r¯5104r¯5 = 0. Then for all
r1 > r¯ , there exists an equilibrium where all high-type managers
diversify and some low-type managers diversify. Furthermore,
cL41105 is weakly increasing in r1; strictly increasing over 6r¯1 rˆ 71
where rˆ is defined such that a low-type manager with cost type c¯ is
indifferent between diversifying and staying focused if the investor
has beliefs14r¯5= q4r¯5104r¯5= 0; and constant above rˆ .
Proof of Lemma 3. Given c¯ and r1 > r¯ , diversification is
a best response for all high-type managers. This implies that
1 = q4r15/4q4r15+H4cL41105541 − q4r1555 ≥ q4r15, 0 = 0.
Because the return from staying focused is zero for low
types, cL41105 = E4  L1d = 111105, where we denote
the manager’s payoff as . Note that 1 is decreasing
in cL41105 within the range 6q4r151171 and cL41105 is
increasing in 1. It follows that a unique equilibrium exists.
By construction, for r1 > rˆ , cL41105 = c¯. All that remains
is to show that cL41105 is increasing over 6r¯1 rˆ 70
The equilibrium defines thresholds as functions of q4r15:




where the asterisks indicate equilibrium quantities. From










































Lemma 4. There exists an equilibrium with diversification
such that the derivative ¡ck41115/¡r1, k ∈ 8H1L9, is weakly
positive everywhere and strictly positive over some range.
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Proof of Lemma 4. This proof is by construction. For
r1 > r¯ , take the equilibrium defined in Lemma 3. For r1 ∈
6r ∈ r¯ 7, take the equilibrium shown in Lemma 2, where r is
chosen such that the thresholds are nondecreasing. Finally,
for r1 < r1 take the no diversification equilibrium, i.e., where
beliefs are such that 1 = 012 = q4r15. Note that because the
equilibrium identified in Lemma 3 has the highest thresh-
olds for an equilibrium for the given r1, by continuity, there
must exist r < r¯0 
Proof of Result 1. (i) The cutpoints 8ck9 are weakly
increasing in r1, and cj is independent of r1. This implies
that conditional on k, the probability of diversification is
increasing in r10 Furthermore, by Lemma 1, we have that
cH 41125≥ cL41125. Using the fact that we have Pr4r1i >
r  H 5 > Pr4r1i > r  L5, we have the result. Part (ii) fol-
lows directly from the fact that the cutpoints 8ck9 are weakly
increasing in r1. Part (iii) follows directly from Lemma 1
in that cH 41125 ≥ cL41125, and strictly so for returns
where we have nondiversifiers. 
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